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1. Introduction 
Academics have shown great interest in intergenerational mobility – the strength of the 
association between individuals’ social origin and social destination. Historically this work 
was the realm of sociologists (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992 for a review), but economists 
have added much to this debate over the last twenty years, particularly through their 
examinations of the link between the earnings (or incomes) of fathers and sons. However, due 
to data limitations, obtaining consistent estimates of earnings mobility remains a non-trivial 
task (Solon 1992; Black and Devereux 2011; Blanden 2013). The contribution of this paper is 
to present new evidence on the consistency of Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Squares 
(TSTSLS) estimates of earnings mobility; a methodology now widely applied in this 
literature (Appendix A reviews almost 30 papers where it has been used). Indeed, TSTSLS 
has proven to be the only way to estimate earnings mobility in a number of countries, 
including Australia, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Japan, China and South Africa. It has 
therefore played in cross-national comparisons of earnings mobility; of the 20 countries 
included in Corak (2012), TSTSLS has been used in more than half.   
Yet, despite the important work of Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and 
Ermisch (2008), more needs to be known about the consistency of TSTSLS estimates of 
earnings mobility. We therefore build upon the aforementioned authors’ work by extending 
their framework from the intergenerational elasticity (β) to the intergenerational correlation 
(ρ), quantifying the inconsistency of TSTSLS estimates when using a range of different 
instrumental (imputer) variables, and considering a potentially important (yet little discussed) 
measurement issue.  
The TSTSLS estimation procedure can be summarised as follows. Ideally, earnings 
mobility would be estimated via the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝛼 +  𝛽. 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 +  𝑢          (1) 
Where: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = (Log) permanent earnings of sons 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = (Log) permanent earnings of fathers 
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Two different measures of earnings mobility would then typically be produced, the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity (𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆): 
𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
           (2) 
Where: 
𝜎𝑋,𝑌 = The covariance between father’s and son’s permanent earnings 
𝜎𝑋
2= The variance of father’s earnings 
and the intergenerational correlation (𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆): 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
=
 𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋.𝜎𝑌
         (3) 
Where: 
𝜎𝑋= The standard deviation of father’s earnings 
𝜎𝑌= The standard deviation of son’s earnings 
The measure of 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 preferred in the literature is a time-average of father’s annual earnings 
across several years (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺)
1. However, in many countries, earnings data cannot be linked 
across generations – i.e. there is no dataset where both father’s and son’s earnings can be 
observed. The TSTSLS approach attempts to overcome this problem via imputation – 
predictions of father’s earnings are made based upon other observable characteristics (e.g. 
their occupation and education level). Equation 1 is then estimated using these predictions of 
father’s earnings (?̂?) instead of a measure that has been directly observed (e.g. 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺). This is 
often described as an instrumental variable technique in the earnings mobility literature (e.g. 
Lefranc and Trannoy 2005; Nuñez and Miranda 2011), though it can alternatively be viewed 
as a cold-deck imputation procedure (Nicoletti and Ermisch 2008) or a ‘generated regressor’ 
approach (Murphy and Topel 1985; Wooldridge 2002:115; Inoue and Solon 2010).  
                                                          
1 Although five consecutive years of father’s earnings is often used (Solon 1992; Vogel 2008; Björklund and 
Chadwick 2003; Hussain et al 2009; Corak and Heisz 1999), more than ten may be needed if there is substantial 
auto-correlation in the transitory component of earnings over time (Björklund and Jäntti 2009; Mazumder 2005). 
For recent evidence see Nybom and Stuhler (2016). 
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Solon (1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) consider 
the properties of TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational elasticity (𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). They show 
that consistent estimates can be obtained if either: 
 The instrumental (imputer) variables have no direct effect upon son’s earnings 
 The R2 of the equation used to predict father’s earnings equals one  
Yet, as father’s education and occupation are the instruments (imputer variables) usually 
available, it is widely recognised that neither of these conditions hold. (Father’s education 
and social class are likely to independently influence offspring’s earnings, while also not 
being perfect predictors of father’s permanent earnings). It is thus often stated that 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
will be upward inconsistent as a result (Blanden 2013). 
 The key issue thus becomes the magnitude of this upward inconsistency. Is it small 
enough to be safely ignored, or is it so large that TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility 
become problematic? Likewise, if more detail is added to the model predicting father’s 
earnings, does this significantly reduce the upward inconsistency? Unfortunately, little is 
currently known about these important issues. Indeed, the only study to quantify the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is Björklund and Jäntti (1997). For one particular imputation model, 
containing a specific set of predictor variables, they find upward inconsistency of around 30 
percent. 
 We contribute to this evidence base in multiple ways. First, the framework of 
Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008) is extended from the 
intergenerational elasticity to the intergenerational correlation ( 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ). We use this to 
explain why 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is downward inconsistent in our empirical analysis (i.e. in the opposite 
direction of the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ). Second, new evidence is provided on the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 using a range of different imputer variables, and thus 
the extent to which this problem can be reduced through the use of a more detailed first-stage 
prediction model. Third, we divide 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 into components to demonstrate what 
is driving their inconsistency, and show how this changes when different prediction models 
are specified. Finally, we note how most studies make predictions of father’s current earnings 
(𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), whereas permanent earnings (𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) is the actual unobserved variable of interest. 
We argue that, in this situation, more general expressions for the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
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and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  are needed. Our empirical analysis then illustrates how conventional wisdom 
(e.g. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 always being upward inconsistent) no longer necessarily holds.  
The paper now proceeds as follows. Properties of TSTSLS earnings mobility 
estimates are reviewed in section 2. This is followed by an overview of the Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) dataset and our empirical methodology in section 3. Results are 
presented in section 4, and conclusions in section 5. 
2. TSTSLS estimates of earnings mobility  
Our starting point is the framework of Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008). As noted in the 
introduction, the model of interest is: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽. 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝜇         (4) 
Where: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = Log son’s permanent earnings 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 = Log father’s permanent earnings 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is unobserved in the ‘main’ dataset, but it does contain additional characteristics (Z), 
such as father’s education and occupation, likely to be associated with 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒.  
 Now say a second ‘auxiliary’ sample (i) contains a measure of respondents’ 
permanent earnings2 (ii) is drawn from the same population and (iii) contains the same Z 
variables. The following OLS regression model can be estimated: 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝛿. 𝑍 + 𝑣           (5) 
Where: 
Z = The instrumental (imputer) variables 
And then used to predict log permanent father’s earnings: 
?̂? =  ?̂?. 𝑍            (6) 
                                                          
2 Time-average earnings would be the preferred measure within the auxiliary dataset. Unfortunately, this is 
rarely available, so current earnings are often used as the ‘first-stage’ dependent variable instead. We illustrate 
how this influences TSTSLS estimates in section 4. 
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Where: 
?̂? = Predicted log father’s permanent earnings 
𝛿= Estimated regression coefficients from the first-stage prediction model 
Hence (7) can now be estimated rather than (1): 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝛽. ?̂? + 𝑢           (7) 
Estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 then follow from equations 2 and 3 (substituting ?̂? for 𝑋). 
The two most commonly used Z variables are father’s education and occupation (see 
Appendix A). However, both are likely to directly influence son’s earnings (i.e. they are 
likely to be endogenous). Consequently, son’s log earnings will actually be given by: 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 =  𝜆1. 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 + 𝜆2. ?̂? + 𝑢        (8) 
With 𝜆1 being the direct impact of the father’s actual permanent earnings on son’s earnings 
and 𝜆2 the effect of father’s predicted earnings on son’s earnings. (From this point forward, 
we drop the ‘True’ subscript for notational convenience). Building upon the work of Solon 
(1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997) argue that 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 thus converges in probability to: 
  
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  𝜆1 + 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜂.𝜎𝑋
  
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. 𝜎?̂?.
(1−𝜂2)
𝜂.𝜎𝑋
          (9) 
Where: 
𝜎?̂? = The standard deviation of father’s predicted earnings 
𝜎𝑋= The standard deviation of father’s actual long-run earnings 
With: 
𝜂 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑋
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
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Where: 
𝜎?̂?,𝑋= The covariance between predicted and actual log father’s earnings 
Under the assumption that the limit of the covariance between predicted and actual log 
father’s earnings is asymptotically equal to the covariance between predicted father’s 
earnings and itself: 
𝜎?̂?,𝑋 = 𝜎?̂?,?̂?                     (10) 
𝜂 becomes3: 
𝜂 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑋
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
=
𝜎?̂?,?̂?
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
 =
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑋
=  
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑋
= 𝑅             (11) 
Where: 
R = The square root of the variance explained (R2) in the first-stage prediction model (i.e. of 
equation 5). 
The probability limit of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 then becomes: 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. 𝜎?̂?.
(1−
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎𝑋
2)
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑋
.𝜎𝑋
 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. 𝜎?̂?.
(1−
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎𝑋
2)
𝜎?̂?.
 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. (1 −
𝜎?̂?
2
𝜎𝑋2
) 
= 𝛽 + 𝜆2. (1 − 𝑅
2)               (12) 
With the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 therefore: 
 𝜆2. (1 − 𝑅
2)                    (13) 
                                                          
3 The covariance between a variable and itself is asymptotically equal to the variance of that variable. Hence 
𝜎?̂?,?̂?becomes 𝜎?̂?
2. 
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There are a number of important points to note about (11), (12) and (13). First, as 0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1, 
the variance of father’s predicted earnings must be less than or equal to the variance of actual 
father’s earnings: 
0 < 𝜎?̂?
2 ≤  𝜎𝑋
2  
Second, if the variance of father’s predicted earnings (𝜎?̂?
2) were equal to the variance of 
father’s actual earnings (𝜎𝑋
2), then R2=1 and the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 reduces to zero. 
Hence, in this framework, the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is driven by incorrect estimation of 
the variability in father’s predicted earnings. Third, if the Z variables are indeed exogenous 
with respect to son’s earnings, then 𝜆2  equals 0, and 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  is consistent. However, if 
parental education and occupation are the Z chosen, 𝜆2  will almost certainly be positive 
(𝜆2>0). Thus, under the reasonable assumption that 𝜆2>0, and given R
2 ≤ 1, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 will be 
upwardly inconsistent. Fourth, if everything else remains unchanged, the magnitude of this 
upward inconsistency will decrease as the variance explained in the first-stage prediction 
equation increases. Or, to put this another way, the upward inconsistency will decrease as the 
variance of father’s predicted earnings tends towards the variance of father’s actual earnings 
(𝜎?̂?
2  →  𝜎𝑋
2). Fifth, it is important to recognise, however, that including additional variables 
to increase the R2 of the first-stage prediction equation may simultaneously influence 𝜆2. 
Consequently, adding a particularly endogenous Z variable could increase 𝜆2  to such an 
extent that it more than offsets the benefits of any change to the first-stage R2. Whether 
adding variables to the prediction equation reduces the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is therefore 
an (underexplored) empirical issue, representing a gap in the literature that this paper 
attempts to fill. 
 Next, we extend the framework of Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Nicoletti and 
Ermisch (2008) to the intergenerational correlation (𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). If one could observe 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 and 
𝑌𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒, ρ would simply be: 
𝜌 = 𝛽.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
                                (14) 
Replacing 𝜎𝑋 with 𝜎?̂?, and β with 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 converges in probability to: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 .
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
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  = [𝛽 + 𝜆2. (1 − 𝑅
2)]. 
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
 
  = [𝛽.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
+ 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)]                            (15) 
The inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is then given by (15) – (14): 
[𝛽.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
+ 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)] - 𝛽.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
 
=  𝛽. [
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
−
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
] + 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)                 (16) 
Now define A as the left-hand side of (16) and B as the right-hand side: 
𝐴 =  𝛽. [
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
−
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
]                     (17) 
𝐵 = 𝜆2.
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
. (1 − 𝑅2)               (18) 
Under the previously stated assumption that 𝜎?̂?
2 ≤ 𝜎𝑋
2, then A ≤ 0 (i.e. this will lead to 
downward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). In contrast, assuming that 𝜆2>0 then, as R
2 ≤ 1, B ≥ 0 
(i.e. this will lead to upward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆). Therefore, unlike 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, one does 
not know the direction of the inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. Rather, it depends upon the relative 
magnitudes of A and B. This is again an empirical issue, which we provide the first evidence 
upon in our analysis. 
 The derivations presented above have all relied upon the following assumptions:  
 The main and auxiliary datasets are random samples from the same population 
 The Z variables are independent and identically distributed across the two datasets 
 That 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is the first-stage dependent variable, and it is this quantity that we wish to 
impute into the main dataset. 
To meet these assumptions, it would be ideal for the main and auxiliary datasets to be 
identical (with the exception, of course, that the former does not include 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 ). In this 
situation, the consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is driven solely by the choice of imputer 
variables (Z) as set out above.  
9 
  
 In reality, these assumptions may not be met. For instance, Björklund and Jäntti 
(1997) note it is common for respondents to report their own education and occupation (Z) in 
the auxiliary dataset, but for offspring’s proxy reports of their father’s characteristics to be 
available in the main dataset. The impact this has upon the consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 will depend upon the nature and extent of this measurement error. We therefore also 
consider this issue in our empirical analysis. 
Moreover, there is the additional complication of how father’s earnings are measured 
in the auxiliary dataset. Returning to equation (5), it has thus far been implicitly assumed that 
𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 (permanent father’s earnings) is available within the auxiliary dataset.  Yet, in practise, 
this is almost never the case. Rather, researchers typically have access to data for a cross-
section of adults whose earnings are recorded for one particular year (𝑋𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐸). A common 
choice is a labour force survey, for example. Therefore the prediction model is often specified 
as (19) rather than (5): 
𝑋𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐸 = 𝛿. 𝑍 + 𝛾. 𝐴 + 𝑣                              (19) 
where: 
𝑋𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐿𝐸 = Earnings in a single year for a cross-section of adults 
𝑍 = The imputation variables 
A = Age group dummy variables 
Estimates from (19) are then used to generate predictions of father’s earnings in the main 
dataset instead of equation (6), with age set to around 404.  
?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 =  ?̂?. 𝑍 + 𝛾. 𝐴𝑔𝑒40                             (20) 
Yet little is known about the consistency of TSTSLS estimates in such situations, where the 
first-stage dependent variable (𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ) differs from the unobserved construct of interest 
(𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). Indeed, this issue was not explicitly considered by Björklund and Jäntti (1997) or 
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2008), and should not be assumed to be an innocuous change to the 
framework presented above. Moreover, our reading of the literature is that almost all existing 
                                                          
4 We have chosen age 40 as this is the approximate point when earnings peak. However, we note recent work by 
Nybom and Stuhler (2016) who suggest that although ‘lifecycle bias is smallest when incomes are measured 
around midlife’ is its very difficult to ‘predict the ideal age of measurement’. 
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income mobility studies applying the TSTSLS estimator use 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  as the first-stage 
dependent variable rather than 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒. 
We illustrate this point with an example. First, suppose that 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 is contained within 
the auxiliary dataset, along with a sufficiently rich set of Z so that the first-stage R2 equals 
one. Consequently, ?̂?  will be identical to 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 , thus resulting in consistent estimates of 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  (e.g. recall equation 13). Now consider the same scenario, but where 
𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 is the first-stage dependent variable. A first-stage R
2 of one would imply that ?̂? =
 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 , resulting in rather different estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  (i.e. it is well 
established in the literature that 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 ≠ 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒  – see Solon 1992 and Blanden 2013). 
Specifically, the use of 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 would lead to downwardly inconsistent estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. This highlights how the corollaries presented within the framework above (e.g. 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  always being upward inconsistent) do not necessarily hold when the first-stage 
variable being imputed (𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒) differs from the construct actually of interest (𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). 
 More general expressions for the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 are therefore 
required, which hold whether either 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  or 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒  are used as the first-stage dependent 
variable. First, consistent estimates of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 from equation (1) converge in probability to: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
                      (21) 
Under TSTSLS, as X is unavailable, ?̂? enters in its place: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?
2                             (22) 
The inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is now given by (22) minus (21): 
𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?
2 −  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
                                (23) 
Note that, in this more general framework, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  can be either upwards or downwards 
inconsistent. Indeed, the direction and magnitude of the inconsistency depends upon one’s 
ability to correctly estimate the ratio of the covariance between father’s and son’s earnings 
(𝜎𝑋,𝑌) to the variance of father’s earnings (𝜎𝑋
2). 
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 Equations (24) to (26) provide analogous expressions for 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.  If 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 and 𝑌𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
were available in the main dataset, ρ could be consistently estimated by: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜌 =  
𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋2
.
𝜎𝑋
𝜎𝑌
=
 𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋.𝜎𝑌
                            (24) 
Replacing, 𝑋 with ?̂?, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 converges in probability to: 
𝑃𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  
𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?
2 .
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
=
 𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑌
                       (25) 
with the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 now given by (25) minus (24): 
 𝜎?̂?,𝑌
𝜎?̂?.𝜎𝑌
 - 
 𝜎𝑋,𝑌
𝜎𝑋.𝜎𝑌
                                   (26) 
In our empirical analysis we illustrate how the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 can vary 
depending on whether 𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑔  (as a measure of 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 ) or 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  is used as the first-stage 
dependent variable.  
To conclude, we note that generated regressors (e.g. ?̂?) are also subject to sampling 
variation. Consequently, second stage standard errors will be underestimated unless this 
additional uncertainty is taken into account. Murphy and Topel (1985), Wooldridge (2002) 
and Inoue and Solon (2010) provide formulae to make an appropriate adjustment to the 
estimated standard errors, while Björklund and Jäntti (1997), Inoue and Solon (2010) and 
Piraino (2014) suggest bootstrapping as a viable (if computer intensive) alternative. We do 
not dwell on this issue in this paper, and focus upon the inconsistency of TSTSLS point 
estimates. Nevertheless, this additional source of sampling uncertainty should also always be 
taken into account when applying such generated regressor techniques. 
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3. Data 
The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a nationally representative sample of US 
households, with the data available for download from 
http://simba.isr.umich.edu/default.aspx. It began in 1968, with annual follow-ups to 1997, 
and bi-annual interviews thereafter. Detailed information has been collected at each sweep 
from the household head and their partner. Offspring are tracked as they leave the initially 
sampled household. Consequently, the PSID contains earnings information across multiple 
years for both fathers and sons. Throughout our analysis we restrict the sample to include 
sons who were household heads aged between 30 and 60 in 2011, and who reported their 
earnings for the previous year. Moreover, we only include sons whose father can be 
identified, has reported annual earnings on at least five occasions during their prime working 
years (between ages 30 and 60), and where both parent and offspring reports of father’s 
education, occupation and industry are available.  
After making these restrictions, our working sample equals 1,024 observations. 
Approximately 80 percent of these individuals have at least 15 reports of father’s annual 
earnings available, with 60 percent having 20 or more. A ‘permanent’ measure of father’s 
earnings is created by averaging across all available reports for each sample member. We call 
this 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺, the closest measure to 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 available in the PSID. All earnings data have been 
adjusted to 2010 prices.  
 As part of each PSID sweep, fathers were asked detailed questions about their 
educational attainment, occupation and industry (we label father’s reports of these variables 
as 𝑍𝐹𝐴). Education has been recorded using the highest grade ever completed, which we have 
converted into eight groups. Occupation and industry have been recorded using three digit 
census codes. These are finely defined categories – separating occupations and industries into 
approximately 200 groups. We use this detailed information on father’s occupation and 
industry (taken from the year their offspring turned age 15) as the key imputer variables (Z)5. 
At times, we also use more broadly defined ‘1 digit’ occupation (10 categories) and industry 
(12 categories) groups. 
                                                          
5 We have also created a ‘modal’ value for father’s occupation and industry. This is where we take the most 
often reported occupation and industry of the father when their offspring were growing up. Approximately 75 
percent of observations remain within the same occupation and industry category, regardless of whether the age 
15 or modal category is used. Likewise, both variables show similar levels of consistency with sons’ reports of 
this information.  
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Sons also reported similar information about their father’s education, occupation and industry 
(denoted 𝑍𝐶𝐻). For instance, in the 2011 sweep, sons were asked: 
How much education did your father complete? 
What was your father’s usual occupation when you were growing up? 
What kind of business or industry was that in? 
Information on Z is thus available both directly from fathers (𝑍𝐹𝐴) and indirectly via their 
sons (𝑍𝐶𝐻). We exploit this in the following section to examine the robustness of TSTSLS 
mobility estimates to who reports the Z characteristics.     
Creating an auxiliary dataset 
The 1,024 PSID observations described above form our ‘main’ dataset (PSID-MAIN). To 
create an auxiliary dataset, we sample with replacement from these individuals. This 
generates an auxiliary sample containing 500,000 observations. (Henceforth PSID-AUX). 
The intuition behind this approach is similar to creating a single bootstrap re-sample. (Indeed, 
if we were to create an auxiliary dataset of size 1,024, this would be equivalent to us taking a 
single bootstrap re-sample). Specifically, by randomly re-sampling from PSID-MAIN, we 
create a second random draw of individuals who belong to the same population. This 
approach has three important advantages. First, one can guarantee that the main and auxiliary 
datasets are drawn from the same population. Second, the main and auxiliary datasets contain 
exactly the same variables measured in exactly the same way. Third, the size of the auxiliary 
dataset is under our control.  
This method for generating the auxiliary dataset differs from the standard procedure 
used in the literature, where two completely different datasets are typically used for the 
‘auxiliary’ and ‘main’ samples. Our justification for following this different approach is that 
this standard procedure used in the literature actually suffers from two problems (i) the 
potential inconsistency in the TSTSLS estimator and (ii) whether the main and auxiliary 
datasets chosen are truly comparable (e.g. do they represent the same population, define 
variables in the same way, both have high response rates). The focus of this paper is point (i) 
– the inconsistency in the TSTSLS estimator. We therefore want to abstract from point (ii) – 
the potential additional difficulty of finding two truly comparable datasets. Our method of 
generating the auxiliary dataset allows us to achieve this important goal, allowing us to rule 
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out non-comparability of data as an explanation for our results. Nevertheless, appreciating 
that this is a somewhat different approach, section 4.4 describes how we have investigated the 
robustness of our results to generating the auxiliary dataset in a different way. 
We exploit this important advantage to produce TSTSLS mobility estimates under 
‘ideal conditions’ (i.e. large auxiliary dataset, identical measurement of key variables across 
datasets, samples drawn from the same population). This enables us to investigate the 
consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 under different choices of the Z (imputer) variables. We 
then add additional complicating factors into the analysis (e.g. measurement of Z differing 
across datasets) to investigate the robustness of TSTSLS estimates to some of the other 
challenges researchers face.  
Methodology 
PSID-AUX is used to impute father’s earnings (?̂?) into PSID-MAIN following the TSTSLS 
approach. The twist, of course, is that PSID-MAIN also contains an actual observed measure 
of father’s long-run earnings (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺). One can therefore investigate how intergenerational 
mobility estimates change when using ?̂? to measure father’s earnings rather than 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺. 
The first-stage prediction model, estimated using PSID-AUX, takes the form:   
𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 =  𝛼 + 𝛾. 𝑍𝐹𝐴 + 𝑢                   (27) 
𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺= Father’s observed time-average earnings  
𝑍𝐹𝐴= Father’s reports of the imputer variables  
The key decision is then which variables to include in 𝑍𝐹𝐴. Appendix A provides an overview 
of those typically used in the literature. There are four common choices: 
(i) broad education level - e.g. Dunn (2007) 
(ii) broad education and broad occupation - e.g. Björklund and Jäntti (1997) 
(iii) broad education, occupation and industry - e.g. Piraino (2007) 
(iv) broad education and detailed (3 digit) occupation - e.g. Leigh (2007) 
This guides the combination of Z used in this paper. Table 1 illustrates the variables we 
include in five different first-stage model specifications (henceforth M1 to M5).  
<< Table 1 >> 
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These are used to impute father’s earnings (?̂?) into PSID-MAIN: 
?̂? =  ?̂? +  𝛾. 𝑍𝐹𝐴                     (28) 
The following regression model is then estimated six times within PSID-MAIN - once 
using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 to measure father’s earnings and five times using the different predictions of ?̂?:  
𝑌2010 =  𝛼 +  𝛽. 𝑋 +  𝜀                     (29) 
Where: 
𝑌2010 = Log annual earnings of sons in 2010 
X = Father’s earnings (measured using either 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 or ?̂?) 
We then compare estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  (obtained using ?̂? ) to 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 
(obtained using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺).  
In our main analysis, son’s earnings (Y) are taken from a single year (2010), when 
they are aged between 30 and 60. Ideally, to minimize the impact of ‘life-cycle bias’ (Haider 
and Solon 2006), a tighter age restriction would have been used (e.g. 35 to 45 year old sons 
only)6. Unfortunately, making such a restriction here would result in a significant reduction in 
sample size. We nevertheless appreciate the importance of life-cycle bias, and have hence 
investigated the sensitivity of our results to using a five-year average of son’s earnings, with 
further details provided in section 4.4. 
4. Results 
This section presents results from our empirical analysis of the PSID. Sub-section 4.1 focuses 
upon the choice of the instrumental (imputer) variables. Sub-section 4.2 turns to the issue of 
who reports the information on these Z characteristics (fathers or their sons). Finally, sub-
section 4.3 considers the impact of how earnings are measured within the auxiliary dataset. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Bohlmark and Lindquist (2006) suggest lifecycle bias is approximately zero when sons are age 38 in the 
United States. However, Nybom and Stuhler (2016) suggest that putting a precise age on when life-cycle bias is 
minimised is not possible.   
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4.1 The choice of instrumental (imputer) variables 
Table 2 compares estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 to 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆. Whereas 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 stands at 
0.5707, TSTSLS estimate M1 equals 0.751, M2 equals 0.770 and M3 0.716. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is thus 
upward inconsistent by approximately 30 percent. 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 declines under M4 and M5 (≈0.65) 
though the upward inconsistency remains non-trivial (15 percent).  
<<Table 2>> 
To provide further insight into these results, Table 3 panel A presents the components 
of the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 , corresponding to equations (9) to (12) in section 2. For 
example, why is the upward inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  not reduced between M1 and M2, 
despite the notable increase in the first-stage R2? Table 3 illustrates that the addition of 
father’s occupation (M2) also influences the direct effect of predicted father’s earnings on 
son’s earnings (𝜆2); it increases from 0.30 to 0.38 as the R
2 moves from 0.39 to 0.46. In terms 
of consistency, losses due to the former are not offset by gains from the latter. Consequently, 
the upward inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  increases from 0.181 to 0.200. This illustrates how 
simply choosing the instruments in order for the R2 of the first-stage regression be as high as 
possible will not necessarily reduce the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 . Indeed, the addition of 
variables which influence 𝜆2 as well as the first-stage R
2 can actually do more harm than 
good.   
Table 3 Panel A also reveals that two factors drive the big reduction in the 
inconsistency between M3 and M4. The first is the large increase in the standard deviation of 
father’s predicted earnings (𝜎?̂?) from 0.388 to 0.451. This, via equation (11), substantially 
increases the first-stage R2. The second is the decrease in 𝜆2, which falls from 0.29 to 0.22. 
Why is there then no further reduction of the inconsistency between M4 and M5? Table 3 
reveals that although 𝜎?̂?  (and thus R
2) increase, 𝜆2 approximately returns back to its level 
under M3 (0.29). The effect of the former cancels out the latter, meaning no net gain 
regarding the consistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.   
                                                          
7 Using a five-year average of father’s earnings, Solon (1992) and Björklund and Jäntti (1997) estimate 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 to 
be approximately 0.40. However, Mazumder (2005) argues that a five-year average of father’s earnings may be 
insufficient to eliminate problems of measurement error and transitory fluctuations. These estimates may 
therefore be downward inconsistent. Indeed, Mazumder obtains substantially higher values of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 (0.61) when 
averaging father’s earnings over 16 years. The fact that we obtain a higher estimate of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 (0.56) than Solon 
and Björklund and Jäntti is therefore likely to be due to father’s earnings having been averaged over more than 
20 years (see Table 1). 
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<<Table 3>> 
Returning to Table 2, 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆  equals is 0.318. The TSTSLS M1 estimate is 0.261; 
downward inconsistency of approximately 18 percent. However 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  increases as 
additional 𝑍𝐹𝐴 variables are added to the prediction model, with the downward inconsistency 
standing at 12 percent using M3 (𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 0.279), and essentially zero using M5 (𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 = 
0.310). The inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 therefore tends to be (a) in the opposite direction (b) 
smaller in magnitude and (c) less sensitive to the combination of the Z variables than the 
inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. Indeed, Table 2 illustrates how 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is not usually too far from 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 . This is important given that, of the near 30 studies applying TSTSLS reviewed in 
Appendix A, only Björklund and Jäntti (1997) report the intergenerational correlation.  
 Table 3 Panel B splits the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  into two components: part A 
(corresponding to equation 17) and part B (corresponding to equation 18). Recall how the 
former induces downward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 , while the latter leads to upward 
inconsistency. It becomes clear that the comparatively small inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
(relative to the inconsistency of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆) is due to these two components partially cancelling 
one another out. However, the downward pressure induced by part A is always slightly 
greater than the upward pressure from part B, leading to the overall downward inconsistency 
of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.  
 What happens as additional variables are added to the prediction model? First, the 
downward pressure induced by part A is always reduced. This is because the standard 
deviation of father’s predicted earnings (𝜎?̂?) is the only term within equation A that changes 
(see equation 17), and can only increase towards the ‘true’ value (𝜎𝑋) as variables are added 
to the prediction model. In contrast, part B includes (
𝜎?̂?
𝜎𝑌
) and (1 – R2), with a greater value of 
𝜎?̂? increasing the former but decreasing the latter. Moreover, 𝜆2 is also found in component 
B, which fluctuates in value between M1 and M5. Thus, whereas adding information to the 
prediction model clearly reduces the inconsistency induced by part A, the influence on part B 
is hard to predict. Our empirical analysis does suggest, however, that gains from the former 
more than offset any losses from the latter. Consequently, the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 does 
generally decline when information is added to the first-stage prediction model. 
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4.2 Measurement of imputer variables (Z) 
The above investigation took place under ‘ideal conditions’, with identical measurement of 
key variables across main and auxiliary datasets. We now investigate the impact of the 
imputer variables being measured using son’s recall of their father’s characteristics (𝑍𝐶𝐻) in 
the main dataset, while individuals own reports are used within the auxiliary dataset (𝑍𝐹𝐴).  
   First, we investigate the uniformity of parent (𝑍𝐹𝐴) and offspring (𝑍𝐶𝐻) reports of 
father’s education, occupation and industry. This investiagtion includes the percentage of 
occasions where father’s and son’s report the same category (‘percentage correct’) and Kappa 
statistics of inter-rater reliability (a statistic which adjusts for agreement occurring by 
chance). Kappa statistics range from -1 (complete disagreement) to +1 (complete agreement) 
with Landis and Koch (1977) providing the following rules of thumb:  
 0-0.20 ‘Slight’ agreement (between parent and child reports) 
 0.21–0.40 ‘fair’ agreement 
 0.41–0.60 ‘moderate’ agreement 
 0.61–0.80 ‘substantial’ agreement 
 0.81–0.99 ‘almost perfect’ agreement 
We find that fathers and sons report the same education and industry on more than 60 percent 
of occasions. Kappa statistics (0.52 and 0.55) are towards the top end of Landis and Koch’s 
‘moderate’ agreement category, with ‘substantial agreement’ when weighted Kappa is used 
(0.72 and 0.67). (Weighted Kappa is where categories further apart are considered to show 
greater levels of disagreement than categories closer together). In contrast, just 27 percent of 
father’s and son’s report the same category for father’s occupation, with Kappa statistics 
suggesting agreement is ‘slight’ (0.16) to ‘fair’ (0.28). One potential explanation is sons were 
asked about their father’s occupation at a vague time point (‘what was your father’s 
occupation when you were growing up?’) which we have compared to the job father’s 
reported holding when sons were age 15. Consequently, we are unable to establish whether 
this lack of agreement is due to son’s inability to accurately recall their father’s occupation, 
or different interpretation of the questions asked (e.g. son’s recalling their father’s occupation 
at a different age). Moreover, the PSID data suffers difficulties with different occupational 
coding schemas used across different sweeps, which may introduce a degree of uncertainty 
into the analysis. 
19 
  
Table 4 illustrates how switching to offspring reports of the imputer variables (𝑍𝐶𝐻) 
influences estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. Overall, this has relatively little impact upon our 
results. For instance, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  ( 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ) is estimated to be 0.770 (0.293) when using 
imputation model M2 and father’s reports (𝑍𝐹𝐴). This changes to 0.824 (0.283) when using 
son’s reports instead (𝑍𝐶𝐻 ). Similarly, under imputation model M5, estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 
(𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ) stand at 0.644 (0.3010) using father’s reports, and 0.661 (0.293) using son’s 
reports. Differences are therefore usually quite small, though on certain occasions are non-
trivial. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis overall suggests that TSTSLS estimates are fairly 
robust to this particular measurement issue. 
<< Table 4>> 
4.3 Imputation of current versus time-average father’s earnings  
Does changing the first-stage dependent variable from 𝑋𝐴𝑣𝑔 to 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  influence 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 or 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆? Table 5 provides results, with 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 measured using father’s earnings in 1980 (or 
the closest available year).  
<< Table 5>> 
Key findings remain largely unaltered under M1, M2 and M3; large upward 
inconsistency in 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 remains, with slight downward inconsistency in 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. However, 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is now much smaller under M4 and M5. For instance, under M5 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 was 0.644 
when using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  (upward inconsistency of 15 percent). But, after changing the first-stage 
dependent variable to 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒, 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 falls to 0.413 (downward inconsistency of 25 percent). 
Similarly, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 using M5 is now 0.231 (downward inconsistency of 25 percent) having 
previously stood at 0.310 (downward inconsistency of one percent). 
 Table 6 breaks these TSTSLS estimates down into their respective components 
(corresponding to equation 22 for 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and equation 25 for 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 ). To begin, the 
covariance between father’s and son’s earnings (i.e. the common numerator of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆) is similar – although always marginally smaller – using 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. For instance, 𝜎?̂?,𝑦 
under M3 falls from 0.108 using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 to 0.101 using 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. Likewise, under M1, M2 and 
M3, the variance of predicted father’s earnings (𝜎?̂?
2) does not seem sensitive to the choice of 
the first-stage dependent variable (e.g. for M3, 𝜎?̂?
2  is 0.151 using 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  and 0.152 using 
𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒). Consequently, none of the key components of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  or 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  are particularly 
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influenced by the use of 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  rather than 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  when the first-stage prediction model is 
relatively sparse. Hence estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  are similar whichever earnings 
measure (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 or 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒)  is used. 
<<Table 6>> 
The same does not hold true, however, under M4 and M5. Specifically, the variance 
of father’s earnings (𝜎?̂?
2) is significantly bigger when the first-stage dependent variable is 
𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. In contrast, the covariance between father’s predicted earnings and son’s earnings 
tends to be slightly smaller. Using M5 as an example, 𝜎?̂?
2 rises from 0.229 (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺) to 0.308 
(𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), while 𝜎?̂?,𝑦 falls from 0.148 (𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺) to 0.127 (𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒).  Thus, while the denominator 
of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 (𝜎?̂?
2) has substantially increased (and is now almost identical to the denominator 
of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆) the numerator (𝜎?̂?,𝑦) has slightly decreased (and remains around 25 percent below 
the numerator of 𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆). This causes 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  to become downwardly inconsistent. Whether 
one uses 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 or 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 as the first-stage dependent variable therefore seems to have much 
more influence upon the key components of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 when a detailed set of Z characteristics 
are included in the first-stage prediction model. 
Building upon the intuition above, the standard deviation of father’s predicted 
earnings (𝜎?̂?) also enters the denominator of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. The increase in 𝜎?̂? from using 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 as 
the first-stage dependent variable (as opposed to 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 ) therefore also puts downward 
pressure on 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. (The impact is less pronounced than for 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 due to the standard 
deviation of father’s predicted earnings being the key term rather than the variance). Indeed, 
when using 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 actually moves further away from 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 as Z variables are added 
to the first-stage prediction model. For instance, the TSTSLS M2 estimate of ρ (0.278) is 
much closer to the OLS value (0.317) than the estimate obtained under M5 (0.230). In other 
words, the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  has increased in absolute magnitude, driven by the 
greater variability in father’s predicted earnings. This is in direct contrast to results using 
𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 (presented on the left hand side of Table 6) where adding Z variables to the prediction 
model almost typically brought 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  and 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆  closer together (i.e. decreased the 
inconsistency). 
These results have important implications. First, changing the first-stage dependent 
variable can lead to rather different estimates of earnings mobility. Second, it is only safe to 
assume 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is upward inconsistent if 𝑋𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 is the first-stage dependent variable (i.e. the 
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earnings measure being imputed into the main dataset). Third, this strengthens the empirical 
evidence that TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational correlation are typically downward 
inconsistent. Finally, even subtle changes to the imputation model can make important 
differences to 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆.   
4.4. Robustness tests 
We have investigated the robustness of results in two ways. First, we have considered how 
our estimates change when using a different methodology to produce the ‘auxiliary’ dataset. 
Specifically, we randomly divide our sample of 1,024 PSID observations into two equal 
groups. The first set of 512 observations are then designated as the ‘main’ sample and the 
other 512 as the ‘auxiliary’ sample. Hence this alternative approach does not use replacement 
sampling to create the auxiliary dataset. Our key findings can be summarised as follows. 
First, we continue to find the intergenerational elasticity to be overestimated under TSTSLS, 
while the intergenerational correlation is slightly underestimated. Second, there is still 
relatively little change to results whether one uses parent or offspring reports of their father’s 
characteristics. Finally, we continue to find that estimates of both 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 can 
differ, sometimes quite markedly, depending upon the first-stage imputation model. 
Second, the results presented above use information on sons’ earnings from the 2011 
PSID wave only, and could therefore be subject to ‘life-cycle bias’. We have therefore 
investigated how results change when using a five-year average of sons’ earnings instead. 
Three features of this supplementary analysis stand out. First, the “preferred” estimate of ?̂?, 
based upon a time-average of both father’s and son’s earnings, is 0.405. This is around 20 
percent higher than when sons’ earnings are based upon the 2011 data alone. Second, 
consistent with the results reported in previous sub-sections, estimates of ?̂? using TSTSLS to 
predict father’s earnings (M1 to M5) are always quite close to the value obtained under the 
time-average approach (typically within 10 to 15 percent). Finally, we continue to find ?̂? to 
be overestimated when TSTSLS is used to impute father’s earnings. This is consistent with 
the key findings presented in previous sub-sections; ?̂? tends to be substantially overestimated 
when using TSTSLS – though with notable improvement as additional information is added 
to the first-stage prediction model. 
Further details on these additional analyses, along with the Stata code, are available in 
the supplementary material (see https://zenodo.org/record/49376#.VwfmDeTmrIU). 
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5. Conclusions 
Intergenerational earnings mobility is a topic of great academic and policy concern. However, 
producing consistent estimates of earnings mobility is not a trivial task. In many countries 
earnings data cannot be linked across generations. Consequently, several studies estimate 
earnings mobility using TSTSLS instead. This paper has presented new evidence on the 
consistency of earnings mobility estimates based upon this methodology.  
 A summary of our results can be found in Table 7. This illustrates the sensitivity of 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 to using different first-stage imputation models and measurement of key 
variables. Column 1 indicates whether 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  (1980) or 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺  (AVG) is the first-stage 
dependent variable. Column 2 indicates whether father’s (FA) or son’s (CH) reports of Z are 
used, while column 3 provides the specification of the prediction model (to be cross-
referenced with Table 1). Columns 4 and 5 provide estimates of 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆. The 
following findings emerge: 
 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 is often (although not always) upwardly inconsistent.  
 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  is particularly sensitive to the choice and measurement of the first stage 
imputation model. Estimates are up to 50 percent upwardly inconsistent or 40 percent 
downwardly inconsistent.  
 Estimates of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 tend to be more stable and suffer less inconsistency.  
 Although the inconsistency of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆  can in theory be in either direction, our 
empirical analysis suggests that, in practise, they tend to be below 𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆.  
<< Table 7 >> 
Based upon our findings, we provide the following guidance to researchers wishing to 
estimate earnings mobility using TSTSLS. First, 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 should both be reported 
where possible. But, if a choice has to be made, our empirical analysis suggests there may be 
reasons to prefer the former over the latter8. Second, the auxiliary and main datasets should 
contain information on educational attainment and detailed (3 digit) occupation as a 
minimum. This means that at least two first-stage specifications can be estimated – a ‘broad’ 
specification (as per our model M2 or M3) and a ‘detailed’ specification (as per our model 
                                                          
8 At the same time, ‘classical’ measurement error in son’s earnings will lead to inconsistent estimates of ρ but 
not β (Black and Devereux 2011). A key implication is that estimating the intergenerational correlation is 
therefore more demanding in terms of the amount of information required. Counter-arguments can therefore be 
made as to why one may prefer β over ρ. In any case, these two measures capture different aspects of mobility, 
with both providing important information. Hence both β over ρ should be reported whenever possible. 
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M4 or M5). One can then investigate how this changes estimates of 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆, 
including a breakdown into their separate components (as per our Table 6). Third, the 
auxiliary dataset should ideally contain information on respondents’ time-average earnings 
(𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺). The use of cross-sectional data with respondents’ earnings reported at a single time-
point (e.g. a labour force survey) should be considered a second-best alternative. Fourth, as 
briefly discussed in section 2, standard errors should be corrected to account for the sampling 
variation in the predictions of father’s earnings. This can be done via a Murphy-Topel 
correction (Murphy and Topel 1985) or appropriate application of a bootstrap technique 
(Inoue and Solon 2010; Björklund and Jäntti 1997). Fifth, researchers should note that their 
estimates of earnings mobility may differ from other studies due to methodological rather 
than substantive reasons. This includes instances where TSTSLS has been used in rather 
different ways (e.g. different combinations, definitions and measurement of key variables). 
Finally, we urge great care to be taken when comparing mobility estimates across studies – 
and across countries - where different methodologies have been applied.  
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Table 1. The imputer (Z) variables used in the first-stage prediction models 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Race √ √ √ √ √ 
Education √ √ √ √ √ 
Occupation (1 digit) - √ √ - - 
Occupation (3 digit) - - - √ √ 
Industry (1 digit) - - √ √ - 
Industry (3 digit) - - - - √ 
 
Notes: M1 to M5 refers to the five different specifications of the first stage prediction model. All 
variables refer to characteristics of PSID fathers. 
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Table 2. Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity (β) and correlation (ρ) using 
different TSTSLS imputation models 
TSTSLS 
model First-stage R
2 
Elasticity  
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
 
Correlation  
𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
 
M1 0.388 0.751 0.261 
M2 0.466 0.770 0.293 
M3 0.489 0.716 0.279 
M4 0.660 0.643 0.291 
M5 0.743 0.644 0.310 
OLS - 0.570 0.318 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample restricted to the same 1,024 individuals 
across all specification. SE stands for standard error. M1 to M5 indicate which first-stage TSTSLS 
imputation model has been used (see Table 1). Estimates using observed time-average father’s 
earnings (OLS) reported in the bottom row.  
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Table 3. Estimates of the inconsistency of TSTSLS earnings mobility estimates 
(a) Elasticity 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
𝜆2 0.300 0.377 0.288 0.221 0.295 
𝜎?̂? 0.346 0.379 0.388 0.451 0.479 
𝜎𝑋   0.554 .0554 0.554 0.554 0.554 
𝜎?̂?,𝑋 0.119 0.143 0.150 0.203 0.228 
R2 0.386 0.464 0.486 0.657 0.742 
𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 
𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 0.751 0.770 0.716 0.644 0.644 
Inconsistency 0.181 0.200 0.146 0.074 0.074 
 
(b) Correlation 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
𝛽𝑂𝐿𝑆 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 
𝜎?̂? 0.346 0.379 0.388 0.451 0.479 
𝜎𝑋   0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.554 
𝜎𝑌  0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Inconsistency part A -0.119 -0.100 -0.095 -0.059 -0.043 
𝜆2 0.300 0.377 0.288 0.221 0.295 
𝜎?̂? 0.346 0.379 0.388 0.451 0.479 
𝜎𝑌  0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
R2 0.386 0.464 0.486 0.657 0.742 
Inconsistency part B 0.064 0.077 0.058 0.034 0.037 
𝜌𝑂𝐿𝑆 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 
𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 0.261 0.293 0.279 0.292 0.310 
Inconsistency  -0.055 -0.023 -0.037 -0.025 -0.007 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. M1 to M5 refer to the TSTSLS imputation 
model specification used (see Table 1). See equation (11) and (12) for the components of the 
intergenerational elasticity and equations (16) to (18) for the components of the intergenerational 
correlation.  
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Table 4. TSTSLS estimates of the intergenerational correlation and elasticity when 
son’s reports of father’s Z characteristics  
  𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
TSTSLS model 
Father’s reports 
(𝑍𝐹𝐴) 
Son’s reports 
(𝑍𝐶𝐻) 
Father’s reports 
(𝑍𝐹𝐴) 
Son’s reports 
(𝑍𝐶𝐻) 
M1 0.751 0.796 0.261 0.266 
M2 0.770 0.824 0.293 0.283 
M3 0.716 0.772 0.279 0.281 
M4 0.644 0.686 0.292 0.276 
M5 0.644 0.661 0.310 0.293 
OLS 0.570 0.318 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample restricted to the same 1,024 individuals 
across all specification. Table illustrates how 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 and 𝜌𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑆𝐿𝑆 differ when using son’s reports 
(𝑍𝐶𝐻 ) of their father’s characteristics (e.g. education, occupation and industry) rather than using 
father’s own reports (𝑍𝐹𝐴). M1 to M5 refer to the specification of the TSTSLS imputation model used 
(see Table 1). Estimates using observed time-average father’s earnings (OLS) reported in the bottom 
row.   
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Table 5. Estimates of the intergenerational correlation and elasticity using different first 
stage dependent variables  
   𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
 
𝑿𝑨𝑽𝑮 𝑿𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 𝑿𝑨𝑽𝑮 𝑿𝑺𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 
M1 0.751 0.794 0.264 0.252 
M2 0.770 0.737 0.293 0.278 
M3 0.716 0.665 0.279 0.260 
M4 0.644 0.479 0.292 0.238 
M5 0.644 0.413 0.310 0.231 
OLS 0.570 0.318 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Sample restricted to the same 1,024 individuals 
across all specification.  𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 where time-average father’s earnings is the dependent variable in the 
first stage imputation model (i.e. ‘ideal conditions’). 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  where father’s 1980 earnings is the 
dependent variable in the first stage imputation model. M1 to M5 refer to the specification of the 
TSTSLS imputation model used (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
  
Table 6. The numerator and denominator of 𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺  and 𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 when ‘current’ 
earnings used as the first-stage dependent variable 
(a) Intergenerational elasticity 
 
First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 
  
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂?
𝟐
 
𝜷𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂?
𝟐
 
  Value % Value % Value % Value % 
M1 0.751 0.090 -49 0.120 -61 0.794 0.079 -55 0.100 -67 
M2 0.770 0.110 -37 0.144 -53 0.737 0.104 -41 0.141 -54 
M3 0.716 0.108 -38 0.151 -51 0.665 0.101 -42 0.152 -51 
M4 0.644 0.131 -25 0.203 -34 0.479 0.117 -33 0.244 -20 
M5 0.644 0.148 -16 0.229 -25 0.413 0.127 -27 0.308 0 
OLS 0.570 0.175 - 0.307 - 0.570 0.175 - 0.307 - 
 
(b) Intergenerational correlation  
 
First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 First-stage dependent variable = 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 
  
  
𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂? 𝝈𝒚   
𝝆𝑻𝑺𝑻𝑺𝑳𝑺 
𝝈?̂?,𝒚 𝝈?̂? 𝝈𝒚 
  Value % Value %   Value % Value %   
M1 0.261 0.090 -49 0.346 -38 1.00 0.252 0.079 -55 0.316 -43 1.00 
M2 0.293 0.110 -37 0.379 -32 1.00 0.278 0.104 -41 0.375 -32 1.00 
M3 0.279 0.108 -38 0.388 -30 1.00 0.260 0.101 -42 0.390 -30 1.00 
M4 0.292 0.131 -25 0.451 -19 1.00 0.238 0.117 -33 0.494 -11 1.00 
M5 0.310 0.148 -16 0.479 -14 1.00 0.230 0.127 -27 0.555 0 1.00 
OLS 0.317 0.175 - 0.554 - 1.00 0.317 0.175 - 0.554 - 1.00 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. M1 to M5 refer to the TSTSLS imputation 
model specification used (see Table 1). 𝑋𝐴𝑉𝐺 where time-average father’s earnings is the dependent 
variable in the first stage imputation model. 𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 where father’s 1980 earnings is the dependent 
variable in the first stage imputation model.  ‘Value’ presents the value of the statistic in question. ‘%’ 
illustrates percentage underestimation relative to OLS results. 
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Table 7. A comparison of TSTSLS estimates using different measures of key variables 
and different imputation model specifications 
(1) First stage 
dependent variable 
(2) Father / son 
report of Z 
(3) Imputer 
variables (Z) (4) β (5) ρ 
AVG CH M2 0.824 0.283 
1980 CH M1 0.801 0.251 
1980 FA M1 0.794 0.252 
1980 CH M2 0.782 0.256 
AVG CH M1 0.796 0.266 
AVG CH M3 0.772 0.281 
AVG FA M2 0.770 0.293 
AVG FA M1 0.751 0.261 
1980 FA M2 0.737 0.278 
AVG FA M3 0.716 0.279 
1980 CH M3 0.706 0.256 
AVG CH M4 0.686 0.276 
1980 FA M3 0.665 0.260 
AVG CH M5 0.661 0.293 
AVG FA M4 0.644 0.292 
AVG FA M5 0.644 0.310 
Time-average benchmark 0.570 0.318 
1980 FA M4 0.479 0.238 
1980 CH M4 0.471 0.213 
1980 FA M5 0.413 0.231 
1980 CH M5 0.346 0.182 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the PSID dataset. Auxiliary dataset sample size set to 500,000 
observations. ‘Imputer variables’ refers to the Z variables used to predict father’s earnings (see Table 
1). AVG / 1980 refers to the first-stage dependent variable (AVG = time-average; 1980 = single 
measure of father’s earnings in 1980). FA/CH indicates whether father’s or son’s reports of the Z 
characteristics used in the main dataset. 
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Appendix A. Intergenerational mobility papers imputing father’s earnings using TSTSLS 
 Country Sample size 
(Main data) 
Offspring’ 
income 
Sample size 
(Auxiliary) 
Imputer variables and 
1st stage R2 
Aaronson and 
Mazumder (2008) 
United States Men, 25-54 years 
old, born btw 1921 
and 1975. 
Earnings 1940-1970: 1% 
sample 
1980-2000: 5% 
sample 
State of birth  
 
R2: Not reported 
Andrews and Leigh 
(2009) 
16 countries  
 
Not reported 
Son’s log hourly 
wage. 
 
 
Not reported 
192 Occupation dummies 
(off-spring reported) 
R2: Not reported 
Bauer (2006) Switzerland  
2,138 
Average 
earnings from 
work 
 
41,362 
Occupation (9 dummies) 
Education (7 dummies) 
Swiss citizen dummy 
R2 = 0.27 
Bidisha (2013) United Kingdom  
 
 
        3,823  
Average log 
wages of full 
time workers and 
earnings of self-
employees over 
the panel 
 
 
 
          935  
Education (3 dummies), 
occupation (3 dummies); 
immigrant status; ethnic group; 
professional level (4 dummies); 
cohort (2 dummies); Hope-
Goldthrope score;  
 
 R2=0.323 
Björklund and Jantti 
(1997) 
Sweden and USA Sweden: 327 
 
 
US: Not reported 
Annual log 
earnings and 
capital market 
income 
Sweden: 540 
 
 
US: Not reported 
Education (2 dummies); 
Occupation (8 dummies); 
Living in Stockholm 
Note: Children reports 
 
R2: Not reported 
Cavagla (2014) Germany, Italy, UK, US Germany = 27,442 
Italy = 6,860 
UK = 14,363 
US = 7,530 
Labour income Germany = 4,534 
Italy = 1,516 
UK = 4,989 
US = 7,918 
Education, occupation 
and industry 
R2 Germany = 0.47 
R2 Italy = 0.34 
R2 UK = 0.31 
R2 US = 0.22 
Cervini-Pla (2015) Spain 3,520 sons  
 
3,995 daughters  
 
Annual log 
earnings of sons. 
For daughters: 
log family 
income and log 
couples’ 
earnings. 
 
 
 
 
        5, 929 
 
 
Education (6 dummies) 
Occupation (9 dummies). 
 
R2: 0.40 
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 Country Sample size 
(Main data) 
Offspring’ 
income 
Sample size 
(Auxiliary) 
Imputer variables and 
1st stage R2 
Dunn (2007) Brazil  
     
      14,872 
Annual log 
“earnings from all 
jobs”. 
 
 
          37,396 
Father’s education (10 
categories) 
 
R2: Not reported. 
Ferreira and Veloso 
(2006) 
Brazil  
 
      25,927  
Log wages.            
 
          59,340  
Father’s education (7 
dummies) 
 Father’s occupation    (6 
dummies) 
 
 R2: Not reported 
Fortin and Lefebvre 
(1998) 
Canada Father – son: 
3,400 (1986) 
2,459 (1994) 
 
Father-daughter: 
2,474 (1986) 
2,308 (1994) 
Annual income Circa 500,000 each 
year 
Father’s occupation (15 
groups)  
 
R2: Not reported 
Gong et al. (2012) China  
 
5,475 
Annual log 
income. 
Varies depending 
on UHIES sample. 
Father’s education; 
Father’s occupation; 
Industry. 
 
R2: Not reported 
Grawe (2004) Ecuador, Nepal, 
Pakistan, and Peru 
Ecuador: 1,461 
Nepal: 229 
Pakistan: 171  
Peru: 98 
Total wage income Ecuador: 685 
Nepal: 239 
Pakistan: 441 
Peru: 166 
Father’s education. 
Lefranc et al. (2010) France and Japan Japan: 987  
 
France 13,487  
Japan: Individual 
primary income 
(labour + assets) 
before tax or 
transfer. 
 
France: Annual 
earnings from 
labour. 
Fathers btw 25 and 
54, in Japan. 
 
Fathers btw 24 and 
60 in France. 
Linking variables: Japan: 
year of birth; 3 
educational levels and 
occupation. R2: N.R. 
 
France: year of birth; 6 
levels of education. R2: 
N.R. 
Lefranc (2011) France  Annual wages  Father’s education (6 
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29,415 
 
 
48,245 
groups). 
Note: Offspring reports 
 
R2: Not reported 
 
 
 
 Country Sample size 
(Main data) 
Offspring’ 
income 
Sample size 
(Auxiliary) 
Imputer variables and 
1st stage R2 
Lefranc and Trannoy 
(2005) 
France and USA  
1977: 2,023 
1985: 2,114 
1993: 771 
 
 
Wages 
 
2,364 – 6,488 
depending on the 
year. 
Father’s education (8 
groups) 
Father’s occupation (7 
groups) 
Note: Offspring reported. 
R2: 0.49 - 0.54 
Lefranc et al. (2013) Japan  
 
 
2,273 
 
 
Gross individual 
income 
 
 
 
7,170 
Father education (3 groups) 
Father occupation (8 groups) 
Firm size (2 groups) 
Self-employment; 
Residential area (3 groups).  
  
R2: 0.46 
Leigh (2007) Australia  
1965: 946 
1973: 1,871 
1987: 243 
2004: 2,115 
 
 
Hourly wages 
 
1965: 946 
1973: 1,871 
1987: 243 
2004: 2,115 
Father’s occupations (78 
to 241 groups depending 
on survey).  
Offspring reported. 
 
R2: Not reported 
Murtazashvili et al 
(2013) 
US and Sweden US:467 
Sweden: 324 
Annual earnings US: 1,613 
Sweden: 565 
Father’s education 
Father’s occupation 
Mocetti (2007) Italy  
 
 
          3,200  
Gross income from 
all sources but 
financial assets. 
 
 
 
 
4,903 
Father’s education (5 
groups; Work status (5 
groups); employment 
sector (4 groups); 
geographical area (3 
groups). 
 
R2: 0.30 
Nicoletti and Ermisch 
(2008) 
UK  
 
 
31-45 years old sons, 
with positive income 
(employed or self-
employed) in at least 
 
 
            896  
Father’s occupation        
(4 groups)               
Father’s education          
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          8,832 one wave of the panel (5 groups).  
 
R2: 0.31 
Nuñez and Miranda 
(2010) 
Chile  
 
 
11,186 
25 to 40 years old 
log earnings of 
sons working at 
least 30hs x week 
 
 
1987: 19,192 
1990: 20,378 
Father’s occupation (4 
groups)  
Father’s education (5 
groups).  
 
R2: 0.29 - 0.37. 
 
 
 Country Sample size 
(Main data) 
Offspring’ 
income 
Sample size 
(Auxiliary) 
Imputer variables and 
1st stage R2 
Nuñez and Miranda 
(2011) 
Chile (Greater Santiago)  
 
 
 
           649  
Log income  
 
 
1,736 - 2,700 
(depending on the 
year) 
Father’s  education (3 
groups)  
Father’s occupation (5 
groups)  
 
R2: 0.48 – 0.66 
Piraino (2007) Italy  
 
 
1,956 
 
Gross income from 
all sources bar 
financial assets. 
 
 
 
953 
Father’s education (5 
groups); work status (4 
groups); employment 
sector (4 groups);  
geographical area (2 
groups) 
 
R2 = 0.33. 
Piraino (2014) South Africa 1,241 - 2,590  Monthly gross 
employment 
earnings. 
1,355 Education (5 groups) 
Occupation (5 groups) 
 
R2 ≈ 0.40 
 Roccisano (2013) Italy 786 Earnings 3,203 Education 
Occupation 
Industry 
 
R2 ≈ 0.20 
 
Ueda (2009) Japan 1,114 married 
sons;  
 
Gross annual 
earnings and 
income from all 
 Father’s years of 
education;  
 
37 
  
906 single 
daughters;  
 
1,390 married 
daughters 
sources. Father’s occupation and 
firm size (7 groups). 
 
R2: Not reported. 
Ueda (2013) Korea and Japan Both countries: 
size varies 
depending on 
civil status of the 
sons and 
daughters 
 
Annual earnings Korea: Fathers btw 
25 and 54 
Japan: 
Korea: education and 
occupation 
 
Japan: parental income . 
 
R2:Not reported 
Ueda and Sun (2013) Taiwan  
 
 
745 
Annual income  
 
 
745 
Father’s education (6 
groups); 
Father’s occupation (11 
groups). 
 
R2: Not reported.  
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